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Abstract
I present a behavioral model of a data analystwho extrapolates a
fully specied probability distribution over observable variables from a
collection of statistical datasets that cover partially overlapping sets of
variables. The analyst employs an iterative extrapolation procedure,
whose individual rounds are akin to the stochastic-regression method
of imputing missing data. Users of the procedures output fail to
distinguish between raw and imputed data, and it functions as their
practical belief. I characterize the ways in which this belief distorts
the correlation structure of the underlying data generating process
- focusing on cases in which the distortion can be described as the
imposition of a causal model (represented by a directed acyclic graph
over observable variables) on the true distribution.
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Data Monkey: One who spends the majority of their time running data and
creating useless PowerPoint slides to please the upper echelons of manage-
ment.(Urban Dictionary, http://www.urbandictionary.com)
1 Introduction
Members of modern organizations are often required to process and present
statistical data. Conventional economic models assume that agents in such
situations act as impeccable statisticians. In reality, the typical analyst will
not reach the heights of statistical sophistication that characterize, say, an
academic econometrician. He will often perform statistical procedures with-
out putting much thought to them, without understanding the implicit as-
sumptions behind them, and without internalizing their implications for the
validity of various inferences.
Even when the analyst does know what he is doing, he faces pressure
to present data in an easily digestible format and underplay its noisiness.
As a result, his nal report may shroud the underlying data limitations and
data-processing methods. For instance, Silver (2012) criticizes economic fore-
casters tendency to present point estimates without providing condence
intervals. Within organizations, the pressure to avoid technical details in
communication with upper echelons of managementis known in manage-
ment folklore as one of Putts Laws: Technical analyses have no value
above the midmanagement level (see Putt (2006, p. 109)). Finally, the
analysts successors may be unaware of how the data sausage was made
(the analyst himself may later forget this), due to imperfect organizational
memory.
The upshot in all these situations is that users of the processed data are
likely to take it at face value, without accounting for how the bottom line was
reached. I refer to a data analyst who communicates processed data without
imparting the underlying data limitations and data-processing methods to
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his audience as a data monkey, adapting the mottos colloquial term.
One example of this general phenomenon involves extrapolation from
non-rectangulardatabases. Analysts regularly confront datasets with miss-
ing values, or multiple datasets that cover di¤erent sets of variables. Turning
them into presentable output requires the analyst to adopt methods for han-
dling missing data. However, these methods often remain hidden. In the
world of academic research, this problem has been documented in various
areas, including medicine (Burton and Altman (2004), Wood et al. (2004),
Mackinnon (2010)), education studies (Manly and Wells (2015)) and eco-
nomics (Kaplan and Schulhofer-Wohl (2012), Meyer et al. (2014)). In par-
ticular, Kaplan and Schulhofer-Wohl describe how an undocumented change
in the US Census Bureaus method of imputing missing data in the CPS had
led economists and demographers to identify a spurious trend in geographic
mobility. They speculate that a certain break in the data may be due to an
unknown aspect of the data-processing methods employed by the Census Bu-
reau. I am not aware of systematic evidence about this phenomenon outside
academia, but causal observation suggests that it is at least as high.
This paper presents a model of an analyst who employs a natural proce-
dure for extrapolating a probability distribution from partial statistics. Users
of the procedures output (including possibly the analysts future self) take
it at face value and it becomes their practical belief. I take this attitude
of users as given, and do not try to derive it from a more basic model. I
characterize the ways in which this belief distorts the correlation structure
of the underlying data generating process. My perspective in this paper is
descriptive rather than normative. I do not deal with how processing, re-
porting and consuming statistical data should be done, but rather with (a
stylized model of) how they are done, and I am interested in the belief errors
that result from the failure to distinguish between raw and imputed data.
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1.1 An OligopolyExample
To introduce the main idea, consider the following scenario. A fresh business
graduate has just landed a job as a junior analyst in a consulting rm. The
analyst is ordered to write a report about an oligopolistic industry. He is not
told who is going to use this report or for what purpose. The analyst gathers
data about three variables: the product price (denoted y) and the production
quantities chosen by producers 1 and 2 (denoted x1 and x2). Specically, he
manages to get hold of two proprietary datasets. Each dataset i = 1; 2,
belonging to producer i, consists of a large number of historical realizations
of the product price and producer is quantity. The datasets cover di¤erent,
non-overlapping time periods.
Having collected the data, the analyst wishes to prepare a le that subse-
quent users (himself included) can readily process. As a rst step, he merges
the two datasets into a single spreadsheet, which is schematically illustrated
by the following table:
x1 x2 y
+   +
  + +
Each row in this table represents a block of observations originating from
one of the datasets; a +( ) sign in a cell indicates that the value of the
relevant variable is recorded (missing) in the relevant spreadsheet elds.
Because the original datasets cover di¤erent sets of variables, the merged
spreadsheet is non-rectangular - i.e., it contains missing values. The an-
alyst wants to ll the missing cells, in order to produce a rectangular
spreadsheet that is amenable to rudimentary statistical analysis that can be
conveyed to users in the form of plot diagrams, tables, simple regressions,
etc. The rub is that subsequent users of the analysts report may treat the
processed spreadsheet as if it purely consisted of raw data, whereas in fact it
mixes raw and imputed values. The frequencies of (x1; x2; y) in the rectangu-
larized spreadsheet will serve as a practical estimate of the joint distribution
4
over prices and quantities in the industry, and this de-facto belief may sys-
tematically distort the true underlying data generating process.
Our analyst employs the following method for lling the missing cells in
his spreadsheet. When the value of x1 is missing in some row, he relies on the
observed realization of y in the row, combined with the joint distribution over
(x1; y) given by the rst underlying dataset, to impute a value for x1 in this
row. Specically, he draws this value from the rst datasets distribution over
x1 conditional on y. Likewise, when the value of x2 is missing in some row,
the analyst draws its imputed value from the second datasets distribution
over x2 conditional on the realization of y in the row.
This extrapolation method is intuitive: the analyst lls the missing values
of x1 and x2 according to his best available evidence (namely, how these
variables are correlated with y), without invoking any explicit prior theory
about the joint distribution of x1 and x2, for which he has no evidence.
The method also has professional credentials: in fact, it is a variant on a
familiar imputation method known as stochastic conditional imputation
or stochastic regression(Little and Rubin (2002, Ch. 4), Gelman and Hill
(2006, Ch. 25)). Thus, the di¢ culties are not with the procedure per se, but
with the danger that users will take its output at face value.
To see these di¢ culties, let us derive the distribution over (x1; x2; y) in the
rectangularized spreadsheet. First, we need to specify the data generating
process. Suppose that each observation in each of the original datasets was
independently drawn from an objective joint distribution p over (x1; x2; y).
Assume further that the two datasets are arbitrarily large. Therefore, the
rst dataset enables the analyst to learn the true marginal distribution
p(x1; y), whereas the second dataset enables him to learn the true marginal
distribution p(x2; y). As a result, in the block of observations that origi-
nates from the rst dataset, frequencies of (x1; x2; y) in the rectangularized
spreadsheet are given by q1(x1; x2; y) = p(x1; y)p(x2 j y). Similarly, in the
block that originates from the second dataset, these frequencies are given by
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q2(x1; x2; y) = p(x2; y)p(x1 j y). The overall frequencies in the nal spread-
sheet, denoted q, are thus given by a weighted average of q1 and q2, where the
weights match the blocksrelative size. However, observe that by the basic
rules of conditional probability,
q1(x1; x2; y) = q2(x1; x2; y) = p(y)p(x1 j y)p(x2 j y) (1)
Thus, both blocks in the rectangularized spreadsheet exhibit the same
frequencies, such that q will be given by the R.H.S of (1), independently of
the original datasetsrelative size. It is evident from this expression that q
satises the conditional-independence property x1 ? x2 j y. Indeed, both
q1 and q2 satisfy it. This property is a direct consequence of the analysts
extrapolation method; it may be violated by the objective distribution p
itself. When users of the analysts report ignore the extrapolation method
behind it and treat it as raw data, they will misperceive the true correlation
structure of p and potentially make economically signicant errors.
For instance, a user may notice that q can be expressed by the R.H.S of
(1). This formula suggests that the price is an exogenous variable and that
producers are independent price takers. This is a causal story that can
be summarized by the directed acyclic graph (DAG) x1  y ! x2 - i.e., the
price is a primary cause, whereas quantities are conditionally independent
consequences. However, this price taking account is empirically ground-
less - it is merely an artifact of the data limitations and the imputation
procedure. Alternatively, suppose that the reports user does not reach the
insight that q is consistent with a causal model. Instead, he directly mea-
sures the correlation between x1 and x2 induced by q. It is easy to construct
objective distributions p for which x1 and x2 are statistically independent
and nevertheless deemed correlated by q. Upon noticing this correlation, the
user may suspect that producers coordinate their activities, in violation of
anti-trust regulations. However, this is a false interpretation of the data: it is
due to the fact that the imputation procedure makes these variables appear
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independent conditionally on y.
Finally, suppose that at some later point in time, our analyst receives a
third dataset that documents the joint distribution of y and x3, the produc-
tion quantity of a third producer (without giving any information that relates
realizations of x3 to simultaneous realizations of x1 or x2). By then, the ana-
lyst has forgotten the origins of his earlier report, having left no record of its
preparation. Like earlier users of that report, he treats q as raw data. The
following is a schematic illustration of the spreadsheet that is produced by
merging the earlier processed database and the new dataset (the star sym-
bol indicates imputed values - although this is a distinction that the analyst
himself does not make):
x1 x2 y x3
+  +  
 + +  
    + +
The analyst proceeds to extrapolate a new joint distribution from this
database, using the same stochastic conditional imputationmethod. When
the value of x3 is missing in some row, he relies on the observed realization
of y in the row, combined with the distribution q over (x1; x2; y), to impute
a value for x1 in this row. And when the value of (x1; x2) is missing in some
row, he relies on the observed realization of y in the row, combined with
the distribution p(y; x3) provided by the new dataset, to impute a value for
(x1; x2) in this row. The overall frequencies in the rst and second blocks of
the newly rectangularized spreadsheet, denoted r1 and r2, are given by
r1(x1; x2; y; x3) = q(x1; x2; y)p(x3 j y)
r2(x1; x2; y; x3) = p(y; x3)q(x1; x2 j y)
Plugging (1) for q, we see that r1 and r2 coincide and can be written as
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follows:
r(x1; x2; y; x3) = p(y)p(x1 j y)p(x2 j y)p(x3 j y)
As before, this formula for r suggests a causal story that can be described
by a DAG:
x1  y ! x2
#
x3
This is essentially the same causal story as before: all three producers are
price takerswhose quantities are conditionally independent consequences
of the exogenous product price y. Thus, the basic extrapolation procedure
can be iterated as new datasets continue to arrive, and its output can be
consistent with increasingly elaborate causal models.
1.2 Preview of the Model and the Main Results
In Section 2, I dene the notion of an ordered database as a sequence of vari-
able sets for which the joint distribution p is given. In the oligopoly example,
the ordered database consisted of the datasets {product price, producer 1s
quantity}, {product price, producer 2s quantity} and {product price, pro-
ducer 3s quantity}. I formalize the iterative extrapolation procedure, which
takes the ordered database as an input and produces a fully specied prob-
ability distribution as an output. The main question is how this output
distorts the correlation structure of the true distribution p.
In Section 1.1, we saw how the procedures output distorts the objective
distribution p as if it imposes a causal model on it. I generalize this idea and
dene the notion of a DAG representationof systematic belief distortion -
following Spiegler (2015), which itself drew on the Bayesian-networks litera-
ture (Cowell et al. (1999), Pearl (2009)). In Section 3, I apply the iterative
extrapolation procedure to a few economically motivated examples of ordered
databases, and I examine whether the output has a (possibly mixed) DAG
8
causal interpretation.
Section 4 is the analytical heart of this paper. I introduce a combinatorial
property of ordered databases - known in the Bayesian-networks literature
as the running intersection property- which requires that the intersection
of every dataset with the union of its predecessors is contained in one of
them. The oligopolyexample satises this property. It turns out that the
running intersection property ensures that the iterative extrapolation proce-
dures output has an essentially unique DAG representation. (The result is
in fact stronger, as it is based on a weaker, analogous property of unordered
databases.) Moreover, it forces the DAG to be perfect - i.e., it has the
property that if two variables are perceived as direct causes of some third
variable, they must be directly linked (the DAGs in the oligopolyexam-
ple are perfect because they vacuously satisfy the antecedent). Conversely, I
show that if a given collection of datasets cannot be ordered with a running
intersection, the procedures output lacks a DAG representation - i.e., for
every DAG we can nd p for which the procedures output does not distort
p according to the DAG.
As a corollary of these two results, I obtain the papers main result: A
DAG representation can be justied as the procedures output if and only if
the DAG is perfect. Perfect DAGs are special in the sense that the direction
of their links cannot be identied from observational data: for any link in
the DAG, we can nd an observationally equivalent DAG that inverts it.
The lesson is that the only DAG representations that can be extrapolated
from ordered databases (via the iterative procedure) are ones whose causal
interpretation is vacuous. Armed with this result, I comment on whether
familiar examples of misspecied subjective models (involving phenomena
such as correlation neglect) can be justied as the outcome of procedural
extrapolation from partial statistics. In later parts, I examine two variations
of the model: an alternative extrapolation method based on the maximal-
entropy principle, and extrapolation from selective datasets.
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2 Datasets and Extrapolation
Let x1; :::; xn be a collection of observable random variables, where n  2
and xk takes values in the set Xk. Denote X = X1      Xn. Let N
be the set of variable indices. For most purposes, it will be simplest to set
N = f1; :::; ng. However, in examples, it is often useful to notate indices such
that their relation to the variables is more transparent. For every S  N ,
denote xS = (xk)k2S and XS = k2SXk. Let p 2 (X) be an objective
probability distribution. I use pS 2 (XS) to denote the marginal of p over
XS.
An analyst obtains partial statistical data regarding p, in the form of a
sequence of m datasets, enumerated 1; :::;m. The interpretation is that the
datasets gradually become available to the analyst. The kth dataset consists
of innitely many observations of a subset of variables Sk  N . Each of
these observations is a random independent draw from p. Therefore, the kth
dataset enables the analyst to learn the true marginal pSk . The sequence
(S1; :::; Sm) is referred to as an ordered database and denoted S, whereas
the set fS1; :::; Smg is referred to as an unordered database and denoted S.
For every k = 1; :::;m, denote Bk = [jkSk. Assume Bm = N - i.e., S
is a cover of N . This reects the denition of x1; :::; xn as a collection of
observable variables. I also assume that no two subsets S; S 0 2 S contain
one another; this assumption is made purely because it simplies notation
at certain points.
At rst glance, my formulation of databases does not t the spreadsheet
metaphor. However, the extrapolation procedure that I present below can
be dened for a more elaborate formulation that matches the metaphor more
closely. Indeed, when stated in such terms, the procedures interpretation as
a method of imputing missing values becomes manifest. However, because
the results in this paper are the same under either formalism, I opted for the
simpler version. For this reason, I will tend to avoid the term imputation
in the sequel and use the more neutral term extrapolationinstead.
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2.1 An Iterative Extrapolation Procedure
The analyst extends the collection of marginals (pS1 ; :::; pSm) into a fully
specied probability distribution over X, according to the following itera-
tive procedure, which consists of m rounds. The output of each round is a
provisional belief qk 2 (XBk), dened inductively as follows:
 For k = 1, q1 = pS1 .
 For every subsequent round k = 2; :::;m, dene two auxiliary distribu-
tions over XBk :
qk1(xBk) = q
k 1(xBk 1)p(xSk Bk 1 j xSk\Bk 1) (2)
qk2(xBk) = p(xSk)q
k 1(xBk 1 Sk j xSk\Bk 1)
and let
qk = k  qk1 + (1  k)  qk2 (3)
where k 2 (0; 1) is some constant.
The distribution qm is the procedures nal output, which I also denote by
f( S; ; p).
This procedure is a straightforward iteration of the basic stochastic
conditional imputationmethod described in Section 1.1. In round 1, the
analyst only has access to the dataset that covers the set of variables S1,
and this enables him to learn pS1 . In round 2, he receives an additional
dataset that covers S2, and he employs the stochastic conditional imputa-
tionmethod to extrapolate the learned marginals pS1 and pS2 into a distri-
bution q2 2 (XS1[S2). By the end of round k   1, having confronted the
partial (ordered) database (S1; :::; Sk 1), the analyst has tentatively extended
the marginals pS1 ; :::; pSk 1 into a probability distribution qk 1 2 (XBk 1).
He subsequently treats qk 1 as if it were raw data - although (for every
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k > 2) it is partly a consequence of earlier extrapolations. And when he
receives the kth dataset, he once again employs stochastic conditional im-
putationto extrapolate qk 1 and pSk into a distribution qk 2 (XBk 1[Sk).
The procedure is terminated at the end of round m, such that the belief qm
is the procedures nal output.
Each round k in the iterative extrapolation procedure (referred to as IEP
henceforth) involves two simultaneous extrapolations, given by the auxiliary
distributions qk1 and q
k
2 . The coe¢ cient 
k is the weight of qk1 in determining
the provisional output of round k. These weights may reect some intuitive
perception of the quality of di¤erent data sources, the importance of the
variables they cover, or the datasets relative size (although they are all
assumed to contain innitely many observations, this is a mere approximation
for large nite datasets).
The latter interpretation ts the spreadsheetmetaphor. Let k > 0 rep-
resent the size of the kth dataset. When the analyst performs stochastic con-
ditional imputationin round k, this method produces k = 1 k=
P
jk j.
The reason is that rectangularizing the spreadsheet blocks that cover Bk 1
and Sk into a single block that covers Bk = Bk 1 [ Sk involves two steps:
using pSk to impute missing values of xSk Bk 1 in the rst block, and using
qk 1 to impute missing values of xBk 1 Sk in the second block. The two steps
yield qk1 and q
k
2 , respectively. In the rectangularized block, the weights that
qk1 and q
k
2 get depend on the relative size of Bk 1 and Sk.
The IEP is entirely non-parametric and invariant to the variablesmean-
ing. This is an attractive feature when X lacks intrinsic structure. In con-
trast, when variables get real values and the analyst has prior reasons to
hypothesize, say, a linear relation among variables, it would be plausible to
incorporate this hypothesis into the extrapolation process (by literally using
a linear regression in the construction of qk1 and q
k
2). Thus, while the proce-
dures generality makes it widely applicable, it also calls for adjustments in
certain applications.
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2.2 DAG Representations
I now formally introduce the notion of a DAG representation, which is a class
of functions that systematically distort the correlation structure of objective
probability distributions as if they t them to a causal model. The IEPs
output in the oligopolyexample of Section 1.1 belongs to this class.
Let (N;R) be a directed graph, where N (the set of variable indices) is
the set of nodes and R is the set of directed links. (In some cases, as in the
oligopoly example, I abuse notation and take the variable labels themselves to
be the nodes, in order to make the DAGs meaning more transparent.) I use
the notations jRi and j ! i interchangeably. The graph is acyclic if it does
not contain any directed path from a node to itself. From now on, I identify
R itself with the DAG. For every i 2 N , denote R(i) = fj 2 N j jRig.
Fix a DAG R. For every objective distribution p 2 (X), dene
pR(x) =
Y
i2N
p(xi j xR(i)) (4)
The distribution pR is said to factorize p according to R. For instance, when
R : 1! 2! 3 4, pR(x) = p(x1)p(x4)p(x2 j x1)p(x3 j x2; x4).
A DAG and the set of distributions that it factorizes constitute a Bayesian
network. In what follows, I refer to pR as a DAG representation. Its interpre-
tation here and in Spiegler (2015) di¤ers from existing interpretations in the
Statistics and Articial-Intelligence literature (e.g., see Cowell et al. (1999)),
in that p is viewed as a true steady statedistribution, such that pR system-
atically distorts an objective distribution into a subjective belief. Following
Pearl (2009), a DAG can be interpreted as a causal model, such that the link
i! j means that xi is considered to be an immediate cause of xj. From this
point of view, R(i) represents the set of immediate causes of the variable xi.
Di¤erent DAGs can be equivalent in terms of the distributions they fac-
torize.
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Denition 1 (Equivalent DAGs) Two DAGs R and Q are equivalent if
pR = pQ for every p 2 (X).
To take the simplest example, the DAGs 1 ! 2 and 2 ! 1 are equiva-
lent, since p(x1)p(x2 j x1) = p(x2)p(x1 j x2). Likewise, all fully connected
DAGs are equivalent: in this case, the factorization formula (4) reduces to a
textbook chain rule.
Frydenberg (1990) and Verma and Pearl (1991) provided a complete char-
acterization of the equivalence relation. The skeleton of R, denoted ~R, is its
non-directed version - that is, i ~Rj if iRj or jRi. The v-structure of a DAG
R is the set of all triples of nodes i; j; k such that iRk, jRk, i /Rj and j /Ri.
Proposition 1 (Verma and Pearl (1991)) Two DAGs R and Q are equiv-
alent if and only if they have the same skeleton and the same v-structure.
For instance, 1 ! 3  2 and 1 ! 3 ! 2 have identical skeletons but
di¤erent v-structures. Therefore, these DAGs are not equivalent: there exist
distributions that can be factorized by one DAG but not by the other. In
contrast, 1 ! 3 ! 2 and 1  3  2 are equivalent because they have the
same skeleton and the same (vacuous) v-structure. As will see in the next
section, two DAGs can be equivalent in terms of Denition 1, and yet di¤er
in terms of the plausibility of their causal interpretation.
3 Examples
The following examples illustrate the IEP and examine whether its output
has a DAG representation. By this, I mean that the IEPs output qm is
equal to the formula (4) for some DAG R and for every possible objective
distribution p (or, in some cases, for every p in some restricted domain).
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Example 3.1: An availability bias
Let m = n   1. The unordered database is S = ff1; k + 1ggk=1;:::;m. This
specication ts the oligopolyexample of Section 1.1. An alternative story
is that each observation in a dataset consists of various characteristics of
some individual. A basic demographic characteristic such as age or gender
- summarized by x1 - is available in every dataset. Other characteristics -
summarized by x2; :::; xn - are domain-specic (e.g., tax or health records)
and appear in one dataset only. Each dataset is a large sample drawn from
an arbitrarily larger population, such that the probability that the same
individual appears in multiple samples is negligible.
For any ordering of S, the output of the IEP is
qm(x1; :::; xn) = p(x1) 
nY
i=2
p(xi j x1)
The proof is by simple induction. Without loss of generality, order the data-
base as follows: S = (f1; 2g; :::; f1;mg). Suppose that the provisional output
of round k  2 is
qk 1(x1; :::; xk) = p(x1) 
kY
i=2
p(xi j x1)
For k = 2, this can be established exactly as in Section 1.1. In round k + 1,
the auxiliary distribution qk+11 is by denition
qk+11 (x1; :::; xk+1) = q
k(x1; :::; xk)  p(xk+1 j x1) = p(x1) 
k+1Y
i=2
p(xi j x1)
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The auxiliary distribution qk+12 is
qk+12 (x1; :::; xk+1) = p(x1; xk+1)  qk1(x1; :::; xk j x1) = p(x1; xk+1) 
kY
i=2
p(xi j x1)
= p(x1)p(xk+1 j x1) 
kY
i=2
p(xi j x1) = qk+11 (x1; :::; xk+1)
hence qk+1 = qk+11 , which completes the proof.
The output qm is a DAG representation, where the DAG R consists of all
links 1! k, k = 2; :::;m. It is consistent with a causal story: the individuals
basic demographic characteristic is a primary cause and the other character-
istics are conditionally independent consequences. This causal interpretation
su¤ers from an availability bias: One characteristic ends up appearing like
as a cause of the others, only because it happens to be available in every
dataset. Moreover, by Proposition 1, every other DAG in the equivalence
class of R reverses exactly one link (otherwise, the DAGs v-structure would
not be preserved), such that x1 is perceived as the cause of all other variables
save one. I will comment on the generality of this availability bias in Section
4.1.
Example 3.2: Education
Our tireless analyst now performs a consulting job for a higher-education
institution. He gets access to three datasets that cover (in total) four indi-
vidual characteristics: number of years of schooling (denoted s), outcome
of a childhood intelligence test (denoted c), fathers number of years of
schooling (denoted f) and wage earnings in adulthood (denoted w). Let
y denote the index of any variable y = s; c; f; w. The ordered database is
S = (ff ; cg; fc; sg; fs; wg). The interpretation is that datasets arrive
gradually over time, and each dataset only covers recent variables. For in-
stance, records about individualswage earnings are likely to indicate whether
they have a college degree, but less likely to specify their childhood test per-
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formance. Here is a schematic illustration of the spreadsheetthat merges
the datasets:
f c s w
+ +    
  + +  
    + +
Let us execute the IEP. In round 1, q1(f; c) = p(f; c). Round 2 works
exactly as in Example 1.1, such that q2(f; c; s) can be written as
q2(f; c; s) = p(c)p(f j c)p(s j c) = p(f)p(c j f)p(s j c) = p(s)p(c j s)p(f j c)
Here is what our metaphorical spreadsheet looks like at the end of round 2:
f c s w
+ +   
 + +  
    + +
Let us turn to the nal round, by writing down explicit formulas for the
auxiliary distributions:
q31(f; c; s; w) = q
2(f; c; s)p(w j s) = p(f)p(c j s)p(s j c)p(w j s)
and
q32 = p(s; w)q
2(f; c j s) = p(s)p(w j s)p(c j s)p(f j c) = q2(f; c; s)p(w j s)
The two distributions thus coincide, such that the procedures nal output
can be written as
q3(f; c; s; w) = p(f)p(c j f)p(s j c)p(w j s) (5)
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As in previous examples, the exact values of the coe¢ cients (k) are irrelevant
for the nal output.
Formula (5) is a DAG representation, where the DAG f ! c ! s ! w
can be interpreted as a causal chain: an individuals paternal education
causes his childhood test performance, which in turn causes his schooling,
which in turn causes his adult earnings. This causal interpretation is intu-
itive, because it tracks the chronological order of the variablesrealizations.
However, it may be false - e.g., when all four variables have a common un-
observed cause. In this case, the conditional-independence properties of q3
(such as s ? f j c) will not be satised in reality. A user of the analysts
output may falsely infer that when he controls for childrens test scores, he
can predict their future school performance independently of their fathers
education.
Comment: Order e¤ects
Unlike Example 3.1, here the IEPs output is sensitive to the order in which
datasets appear. To see why, let S = (ff ; cg; fs; wg; fc; sg). The provi-
sional output of round 2 is q2(f; c; s; w) = p(f; c)p(s; w). In the nal round,
we have q31 = q
2 and q32(f; c; s; w) = p(c; s)q
2(f; w j c; s). The procedures
nal output is
q3(f; c; s; w) = q2(f; w j c; s) 3q2(c; s) + (1  3)p(c; s)
Consider an objective distribution p under which each of the variables f and
w is independently distributed, whereas the variables c and s are mutually
correlated. Then, q2(f; c; s; w) = p(f)p(c)p(s)p(w). Therefore,
q3(f; c; s; w) = p(f)p(w)

3p(c)p(s) + (1  3)p(c; s)
This expression underestimates the objective correlation between c and s (to
an extent given by 3). By comparison, under the same assumptions on p,
expression (5) would be reduced to p(f)p(w)p(c; s), which fully accounts for
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the objective correlation between c and s.
Comment: The causal interpretation of qm
the interpretation that I pursue in this paper is that the analyst lacks any
prior theoretical prejudice: his objective is to obtain a rectangular database
that is amenable to simple, presentable statistical analysis, and he employs
an intuitive extrapolation procedure toward that end. It is not essential
to this interpretation that a user of the procedures output notices that it
exhibits conditional-independence patterns that suggest a causal mechanism.
Suppose, however, that the user does notice that qm is consistent with a
DAG R. This may suggest a causal interpretation to him. And indeed, in
cases like Example 3.2, the causal story is intuitive because it matches the
variableschronological ordering. This may reassure the user of the validity of
the analysts report, exacerbating his lack of interest in the methods behind
it. However, recall the equivalence relation over DAGs. In Example 3.2, the
procedures output could be equivalently written as q3(f; c; s; w) = p(w)p(s j
w)p(c j s)p(f j c), an expression that manifestly factorizes p according to
the DAG w ! s ! c ! f . This DAG entirely reverses the chronological
ordering and therefore makes no sense as a causal chain.
In other cases, qm factorizes p according to some DAG R, and yet no
DAG in the equivalence class of R would make sense as a causal model. For
instance, in the context of the education story of Example 3.2, suppose
that the database is as in Example 3.1, consisting of three datasets that
record the correlation of w with each of the other variables f; c; s. Then,
although q3 has a DAG representation, the DAG necessarily regards w as an
immediate cause of at least two other variables (per our discussion at the
end of Example 3.1). This causal interpretation is absurd, because w is the
last in the chronological order of the variablesrealizations. In situations like
these, when the user notices that qm is consistent with an implausible causal
story, he may be impelled to probe into the methods behind qm, and thus
become a more sophisticated user of processed statistical data.
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Example 3.3: Partial cursedness
Let N = f1; 2; 3g, where x1 represents the action of an uninformed player
in a simultaneous-move game, whereas x2 and x3 represent the information
and action of the players opponent, respectively. In this story, we could
identify the analyst with player 1 (or rather his strategic advisor). Consider
the ordered database S = (f1; 2g; f1; 3g; f2; 3g). The rst two rounds of the
IEP are the same as in the previous examples. The provisional output of
round 2 can be written as q2(x1; x2; x3) = p(x1)p(x2 j x1)p(x3 j x1). Turning
to the nal round, note that q31 = q
2, whereas
q32(x1; x2; x3) = p(x2; x3)q
2(x1 j x2; x3) = q2(x1; x2; x3) p(x2; x3)
q2(x2; x3)
This expression does not coincide with q31. The nal output is
q3(x1; x2; x3) = q
2(x1; x2; x3)

3 + (1  3) p(x2; x3)
q2(x2; x3)

(6)
This is not a DAG representation, and cannot be rewritten as such. How-
ever, the above simultaneous-game story suggests that we should restrict the
domain of permissible objective distributions p to those for which x1 ? x2; x3
- equivalently, those that are consistent with the DAG R : 1 3  2.
The domain restriction implies q2(x1; x2; x3) = p(x1)p(x2)p(x3), and there-
fore q2(x2; x3) = p(x2)p(x3). The formula (6) is then simplied into
q3(x1; x2; x3) = p(x1)p(x2)

(1  3)p(x3 j x2) + 3p(x3)

(7)
This is an example of what Spiegler (2015) calls a mixed-DAG repre-
sentation - namely, a convex combination of two DAG representations -
assigning weight 1  3 to R and weight 3 to the empty DAG. It matches
what Eyster and Rabin (2015) call partial cursedness, where 3 measures
player 1s degree of cursedness - i.e., the extent to which he neglects the
correlation between the opponents information and action. In this sense,
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the IEP provides a foundation for partial cursedness. However, this foun-
dation crucially relies on the assumption that f2; 3g is the last dataset in
the ordered database; any other ordering would have let to an output that
factorizes any objective distribution in the restricted domain according to
R. Also, the foundation does not extend to other restricted domains of
p with a simultaneous-game motivation. For instance, when x2 represents
an uninformed opponents action and x3 represents the games outcome, the
natural domain restriction is x1 ? x2, and then q3 loses the partial-cursedness
structure.
4 General Analysis
In this section I characterize databases for which the IEPs output has a
DAG representation, and the class of DAG representations that can emerge
as outputs of the IEP. A few preliminaries are in order before I can state the
main results. First, let us introduce a few properties of databases.
Denition 2 An ordered database S = (S1; :::; Sm) satises the running
intersection property (RIP) if for every k = 2; :::;m, Sk \ ([i<kSi)  Sj
for some j < k.
Denition 3 An unordered database S satises RIP if there exists an or-
dering S of S that satises RIP.
Denition 4 An ordered database (S1; :::; Sm) is maximally overlapping
if jSk \ ([j<kSj)j  jSi \ ([j<kSj)j for every k = 2; :::;m   1 and i = k +
1; :::;m.
RIP requires that the intersection between any set along the sequence S
and the union of its predecessors is weakly contained in one of them. This
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combinatorial property is familiar from the Bayesian-network literature - see
below. Although it lacks an a-priori appealing economic interpretation, it
happens to hold in a number of realistic situations (including Examples 3.1
and 3.2).
RIP requires that the collection S can be ordered with a running inter-
section. It holds trivially form = 2. To illustrate the denition form = 3, let
S =ff1; 3; 5g; f2; 4; 5g; f1; 2; 5gg. If we order S as (f1; 3; 5g; f2; 4; 5g; f1; 2; 5g),
RIP is violated because f1; 2; 5g \ (f1; 3; 5g [ f2; 4; 5g) = f1; 2; 5g is not
contained in any of the rst two sets in the sequence. In contrast, the se-
quence (f1; 3; 5g; f1; 2; 5g; f2; 4; 5g) satises RIP because f2; 4; 5g\(f1; 3; 5g[
f1; 2; 5g) = f2; 5g  f1; 2; 5g. Therefore, ff1; 3; 5g; f1; 2; 5g; f2; 4; 5gg satis-
es RIP. Conversely, the database ff1; 3g; f1; 2g; f2; 3gg violates RIP; its
members cannot be ordered in a way that satises RIP.
The maximal-overlap property requires that Sk has at least as many vari-
ables in common with previous observed datasets as any subsequent dataset.
This property makes particular sense when, for instance, variables are real-
ized according to some chronological order, and as new datasets arrive over
time, they tend to cover recent variables. Example 3.2 ts this interpretation.
The property can also reect the analysts own initiative: in his attempts to
broaden the database, he deliberately seeks datasets that maximally overlap
prior datasets, because he wishes to extrapolate as little as possible.
The following result, proved by Noga Alon, links the three properties.
Lemma 1 (Alon (2016)) Suppose that the database S satises RIP*. Then,
every maximally overlapping ordering of S satises RIP.
This lemma provides a simple tool for checking whether S satises RIP:
order this collection according to any maximally overlapping sequence, and
check whether the sequence satises RIP.
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Perfect DAGs
Let us turn from properties of databases to a property of DAGs. A subset
of nodes C  N is a clique in R if i ~Rj for every distinct i; j 2 C. A clique is
maximal if it is not a strict subset of another clique. A clique C is ancestral
if R(i)  C for every i 2 C.
Denition 5 (perfect DAGs) A DAG R is perfect if whenever iRk and
jRk, it is the case that i ~Rj.
Equivalently, R is perfect if R(i) is a clique for every i 2 N .1 To illustrate the
denition, 3  1 ! 2 ! 4 is perfect, whereas 3  1 ! 2  4 is imperfect.
When R is perfect, I refer to pR as a perfect-DAG representation.
Remark 1 Two perfect DAGs are equivalent if and only if they have the
same set of cliques. In particular, we can set any one of these cliques to be
ancestral w.l.o.g. (This is a direct implication of Proposition 1.)
What is the meaning of perfection in light of the causal interpretation
of DAGs? By denition, all the postulated causes of a variable in a perfect
DAG are also presumed to have direct causal links among them. However,
Remark 1 implies that the causal interpretation of perfect DAGs is spurious
in the following sense: every causal link postulated by the DAG is reversed
in some equivalent DAG.
Perfect DAGs are related to RIP, via the following result, which is fa-
miliar in the Bayesian-networks literature.
Remark 2 (Cowell et al. (1999, p. 54)) The set of maximal cliques in
a perfect DAG satises RIP*.
1Note that by the denition of R(i), it is a clique if and only if R(i) [ fig is a clique.
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Which marginals get distorted by a DAG representation?
The DAG representation pR generally distorts the objective distribution p:
unless R is fully connected, there exists an objective distribution p for which
pR 6= p. However, certain marginal distributions are not distorted by pR. The
following proposition, which will be useful in the proof of the main result,
characterizes these cases. The proof is relegated to Appendix I.
Proposition 2 Let R be a DAG and let C  N . Then, pR(xC) = p(xC) for
every p if and only if C is an ancestral clique in some DAG in the equivalence
class of R.
Thus, the marginal distribution overXC induced by pR never distorts the true
marginal if C is an ancestral clique in R, or in some DAG that is equivalent
to R. Note that if R is perfect, then by Remark 1, pR(xC) = p(xC) for every
p and every clique C in R.
The intuition for Proposition 2 can be conveyed through the causal in-
terpretation of DAGs. Suppose that C consists of a single node i. When
i is ancestral, it represents a primary cause. The belief distortions that
arise from a misspecied DAG concern variables that are either independent
of xi or (possibly indirect) e¤ects of xi. These distortions are irrelevant for
calculating the marginal of pR over xi. In contrast, suppose that i is not
ancestral in any DAG in the equivalence class of R. Then, there must be two
other variables xj; xk, deemed independent by R, which function as (possibly
indirect) causes of xi. This failure to account for the full dependencies among
the causes of xi can lead to distortion of the marginal distribution over xi.
4.1 The Main Results
We can now state the rst main result. If an unordered database S satises
RIP, then for any maximally overlapping ordering of S, the IEP will generate
an output that can be written as a perfect-DAG representation. Moreover,
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the DAG is essentially unique, because its set of maximal cliques is S (and
by Remark 1, all perfect DAGs with the same set of cliques are equivalent).
Theorem 1 Suppose that S satises RIP. Let R be any perfect DAG whose
set of maximal cliques is S. Then, f( S; ; p) = pR for every maximally
overlapping ordering S of S, collection of coe¢ cients  = (k)k=1;:::;m and
objective distribution p 2 (X).
Proof. I will show that for every p and every k = 1; :::;m, the belief qk 2
(XBk) has a perfect-DAG representation, where the DAG R
k is dened over
Bk and its set of maximal cliques is fS1; :::; Skg. The proof is by induction
on k. Let k = 1. By denition, q1 = pS1 , which is trivially a perfect-DAG
representation (the DAG R1 is fully connected over B1 = S1).
Now consider k 2 f2; :::;mg. By assumption, S = fS1; :::; Smg satises
RIP and S =(S1; :::; Sm) is some maximally overlapping ordering of S. By
Lemma 1, (S1; :::; Sm) satises RIP. This immediately implies that (S1; :::; Sk)
satises RIP, too. By assumption, S does not include sets that contain one
another. Therefore, Sk   Bk 1 and Bk 1   Sk are both non-empty. The
auxiliary beliefs qk1 and q
k
2 over Bk = Bk 1 [ Sk are given by (2).
Consider the expression for qk1 . The inductive hypothesis is that q
k 1 has
a perfect-DAG representation, where the DAG Rk 1 is dened over Bk 1,
and its set of maximal cliques is fS1; :::; Sk 1g. By RIP, Sk \Bk 1 is weakly
contained in one of the sets S1; :::; Sk 1. Extend Rk 1 to a DAG Rk over
Bk, by adding a link i ! j for every i 2 Sk \ Bk 1 and j 2 Sk   Bk 1,
as well as adding directed links among all nodes in Sk   Bk 1 without de-
stroying acyclicity. The DAG Rk is perfect and its set of maximal cliques
is fS1; :::; Skg. Thus, qk1 is a perfect-DAG representation, where the DAG is
Rk.
It remains to show that qk2 coincides with q
k
1 , such that by (3), q
k = qk1 for
any k. If Sk \ Bk 1 = ?, this is self-evident. Now suppose Sk \ Bk 1 6= ?.
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Note that qk1 and q
k
2 can be written as
qk1(xBk) = p(xSk)q
k 1(xBk 1) 
1
p(xSk\Bk 1)
(8)
qk2(xBk) = p(xSk)q
k 1(xBk 1) 
1
qk 1(xSk\Bk 1)
Since qk 1 is a perfect-DAG representation - where the DAG is Rk 1, and
Sk \ Bk 1 is a clique in Rk 1 - Remark 1 implies that w.l.o.g it is an an-
cestral clique. Proposition 2 then implies that qk 1(xSk\Bk 1) = p(xSk\Bk 1).
Therefore, qk2 coincides with q
k
1 .
The following result is a converse to Theorem 1, which shows that RIP
is necessary for the IEPs output to have a DAG representation.
Theorem 2 Suppose that S violates RIP. Then, for every DAG R and
every ordering S of S, there exists an objective distribution p 2 (X) such
that f( S; ; p) 6= pR for any collection of coe¢ cients .
Proof. Suppose that S violates RIP*. Then, any ordering of S violates
RIP. Note that this means m  3. Let k > 2 be the earliest round for which
Sk\Bk 1 is not weakly contained in any of the sets S1; :::; Sk 1. By the proof
of Theorem 1, qk 1 2 (XBk 1) has a perfect-DAG representation, where the
perfect DAG Rk 1, dened over Bk 1, is characterized by the set of maximal
cliques fS1; :::; Sk 1g. It follows that Sk \ Bk 1 is not a clique in Rk 1.
By Proposition 2, there exist distributions p for which qk 1(xSk\Bk 1) 6=
p(xSk\Bk 1). Therefore, by (8), there exists p for which q
k
1 and q
k
2 do not
coincide. I now construct a family of such distributions.
Since Sk\Bk 1 is not a clique in Rk 1, it must contain two nodes, denoted
w.l.o.g 1 and 2, that are not linked under Rk 1. Let p be an arbitrary
objective distribution for which xi is independently distributed for every
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i 6= 1; 2, whereas x1 and x2 are mutually correlated. Then,
qk 1(xBk 1) =
Y
i2Bk 1
p(xi)
It follows that qk1 and q
k
2 can be written as
qk1(xBk) = p(x1)p(x2) 
Y
i2Bk f1;2g
p(xi)
qk2(xBk) = p(x1)p(x2 j x1) 
Y
i2Bk f1;2g
p(xi)
such that
qk(xBk) =
0@ Y
i2Bk f2g
p(xi)
1A  k  p(x2) + (1  k)  p(x2 j x1)
Since all the variables i 6= 1; 2 are independently distributed under p and
k 2 (0; 1) for every k, the continuation of the IEP will eventually produce
a nal belief of the form
qm(x) =
 Y
i 6=2
p(xi)
!
 [  p(x2) + (1  )  p(x2 j x1)]
where  2 (0; 1) is some combination of k; :::; m. Since p(x2 j x1) 6= p(x2)
for some x1; x2, qm 1 does not have a DAG representation.
The key to understanding Theorems 1 and 2 is whether the provisional
distribution qk (at any round k in the IEP) distorts the true marginal over
XSk\Bk 1 . When the ordered database (S1; :::; Sk) satises RIP, Sk \ Bk 1
is weakly contained in some dataset Si, i  k   1. This means that the
ith dataset contains complete raw information about the marginal of p over
Sk \ Bk 1. The proof-by-induction of Theorem 1 employs the properties of
perfect DAGs to ensure that this information is not lost or distorted by the
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time we reach round k, and therefore the marginal of qk 1 over XSk\Bk 1
does not contradict the true marginal of p over this set, which is given by
the dataset Sk.
In contrast, when the ordered database violates RIP, there will be a round
k for which Sk \ Bk 1 is not weakly contained in any dataset Si, i  k   1.
This means that the marginal of qk 1 over XSk\Bk 1 is not exclusively based
on raw data, and thus inevitably involves extrapolation, potentially missing
correlations among variables in Sk \Bk 1. As a result, the marginal of qk 1
over XSk\Bk 1 may contradict the true marginal of p over this set, which is
given by the dataset Sk. In other words, the kth dataset will disagree with
the provisional output of round k   1 over the correlation structure of the
variables in Sk \ Bk 1. This disagreement will persist until the procedures
very end, such that its output will lack the coherent correlation structure
that characterizes a DAG representation.
Example 3.2 demonstrated the role of the maximal-overlap property.
The unordered database satised RIP, and yet we saw that it could be
ordered in a way that violates the maximal-overlap property. This order-
ing gave rise to an output that lacked a DAG representation. However,
unlike RIP, the maximal-overlap property is not necessary for the IEPs
output to have a DAG representation. For instance, the ordered database
(f1; 2; 3g; f3; 4g; f2; 3; 5g) fails the maximal-overlap property but satises
RIP, and therefore the IEPs output in this case has a DAG representation.
The availability bias illustrated in Example 3.1 is a general feature of
the model, in the following sense. Consider a database that satises RIP.
Suppose that the database records the correlation between some variable xi
and many other variables, but does not record the correlation among the
latter. Then, for any DAG representation of the IEPs output, xi will appear
above the other variables (with the exception of at most one of them) in the
DAGs causal hierarchy.
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The following corollaries of Theorems 1 and 2 examine the relation be-
tween DAG representations and the IEP from a di¤erent perspective. Rather
than taking the database as primitive and checking whether it leads to a DAG
representation, we can take the representation as given and ask whether it
can be justied as the procedures output for a suitably specied database.
Corollary 1 Suppose that R is a perfect DAG. Let S be an unordered data-
base consisting of the maximal cliques of R. Then, for every maximally over-
lapping ordering S of S and any collection of coe¢ cients , f( S; ; p) = pR
for all objective distributions p 2 (X).
Corollary 2 Suppose that R is an imperfect DAG. Then, for every or-
dered database S, there exists an objective distribution p 2 (X) such that
f( S; ; p) 6= pR for any collection of coe¢ cients .
Corollary 1 is an immediate implication of Remark 2 and Theorem 1.
Corollary 2 is a consequence of Proposition 1, which implies that imper-
fect and perfect DAGs can never belong to the same equivalence class. By
Theorem 1, if S satises RIP, the procedures output has a perfect-DAG
representation. And by Theorem 2, if S violates RIP, the procedures output
lacks a DAG representation altogether. Therefore, no database can generate
an imperfect-DAG representation.
4.2 Which Causal Models can be Extrapolated?
Corollaries 1 and 2 have special signicance when we consider the causal in-
terpretation of DAGs. Recall that perfect DAGs do not postulate identiable
causal links (in the sense that if iRj, there exists an equivalent DAG R0 such
that jR0i). In contrast, every imperfect DAG R contains at least two identi-
able causal links that belong to the graphs v-structure: these links remain
unreversed in any DAG in the equivalence class of R. Corollaries 1 and 2
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imply that only causal models that make unidentiable causal assumptions
can be extrapolated (via the IEP) from partial statistics. This is consistent
with the familiar motto correlation does not imply causation: the analysts
dataset contains purely observational data; the extrapolation method that
the analyst employs does not create meaningful beliefs about causality out
of thin air.
The two corollaries enable us to shed light on whether natural classes
of subjective causal models can be justied as the outcome of procedural
extrapolation from partial statistics. The following are a few examples.
Fixed-lag causal models
Consider a decision maker whose subjective belief q over X distorts the ob-
jective distribution p by treating each variable as a stochastic function of its
L immediate predecessors:
q(x1; :::; xn) = p(x1; :::; xL)
nY
i=L+1
p(xi j xi L; :::; xi 1) (9)
For instance, when L = 1, q(x1; :::; xn) = p(x1)p(x2 j x1)    p(xn j xn 1).
This specication ts environments in which variables have a natural chrono-
logical ordering, and where subjective perception of the variableshistory de-
pendence is coarseor truncated(as in Piccione and Rubinstein (2003)).
For any L < n, the ordered database S = (fk; :::; k+Lg)k=1;:::;n L satises
RIP and generates (9) as the IEPs output. Thus, a xed-lag subjective
causal model can be justied (via the IEP) as the outcome of extrapolation
from datasets with memory of xed length. Example 2.2 illustrates this result
for n = 4, L = 1.
Correlation neglect
Let n = 3, and consider the DAG R :  ! z  a, where  represents a
state of Nature that a¤ects the value of an object, a represents the bidding
behavior of a player in some trading mechanism, and z represents the mech-
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anisms outcome. Then, pR(; a; z) = p()p(a)p(z j ; a). The DAG R can
be interpreted as a subjective model that postulates the independence be-
tween the players bidding behavior and the objects value. If p violates this
independence property - because in reality the player conditions his behav-
ior on some unobserved signal of  - we have pR 6= p, and thus pR exhibits
correlation neglect(as in Eyster and Rabin (2005) or Jehiel and Koessler
(2008)).
Is it possible for an analyst who has access to partial statistics about
; a; z to extrapolate the correlation structure given by R? Because R is
imperfect, Corollary 2 implies that no database will generate an output that
factorizes every p according to R. The intuition for this impossibility is
simple. In order to estimate the term p(z j ; a), the analyst must have
access to joint observations of all three variables. But this would also enable
him to grasp whatever correlation exists between  and a, whereas pR treats
them as mutually independent.
Thus, the particular form of correlation neglect captured by pR cannot be
justied by our notion of extrapolation from partial statistics. Of course, this
failure is specic to the present example; other forms of correlation neglect
are consistent with the IEP (see Example 3.3).
It is easy to see from this expression why it cannot be obtained by the
IEP.
Observability structures
Let N = f1; 2; 3; 4g. Each variable xi represents the action of a di¤erent
player in an extensive game. Each of the following two DAGs represents a
game form in which each player moves once and the order of moves is xed.
A link i ! j means that j always observes is move. DAGs thus represent
what Eyster and Rabin (2014) refer to (in the context of a social-learning
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model) as observability structures.
2  1 ! 3
& .
4
4  1 ! 2
& #
3
The question is whether an outside observer could extrapolate a belief in
these observability structures from some partial statistical data. The left-
hand DAG is imperfect (R(4) = f2; 3g, and yet 2 and 3 are not linked).
Therefore, no database can generate an output that factorizes every p ac-
cording to this graph. In contrast, the right-hand DAG is perfect, and it will
be extrapolated from any ordering of S = ff1; 2; 3g; f1; 4gg.
What is the broader signicance of these examples? When a subjective
causal model is consistent with the IEP, we can tell an as if story about
the models origin: Agents do not necessary have an explicit prior theory
regarding the correlation structure of their environment; instead, their belief
is based on procedural extrapolation from partial statistics (possibly per-
formed by another agent - our eponymous data monkey); and the belief
only appears as if the agent were trying to impose an explicit causal model
on the true distribution. This argument is in the spirit of axiomatic decision
theory: DAG representations are a tractable formula that captures a range of
systematic belief distortions and possesses a natural (causal) interpretation;
it is instructive to know whether they have a plausible origin story.
5 Relation to the MaxEnt Problem
The IEP is a behaviorally motivatedprocedure for extending partial sta-
tistics into a fully-specied probability distribution over X. An alternative,
more normatively motivatedextrapolation method is based on the crite-
rion of maximal entropy. Consider the unordered database S, which enables
the analyst to learn the marginals (pS)S2S . The analysts problem is to nd
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a probability distribution q 2 (X) that maximizes entropy subject to the
constraint that for every S 2 S, the marginal of q over XS is pS. A more
general version of this problem was originally stated by Jaynes (1957) and
has been studied in the Machine Learning literature, where it is known as
the MaxEnt problem.
The maximal-entropy criterion generalizes the principle of insu¢ cient
reason(recall that unconstrained entropy maximization yields the uniform
distribution). The idea behind it is that the analyst wishes to be maximally
agnosticabout the aspects of the distribution he has not learned, while being
entirely consistent with the aspects he has learned. For instance, suppose
that the analyst only manages to learn the marginal distributions over all
individual variables - i.e., S = ff1); :::; fngg. Then, the maximal-entropy
extension of these marginals is p(x1)    p(xn).2
The following is an existing result, reformulated to suit our present pur-
poses.
Proposition 3 (Hajek et al. (1992)) Suppose S satises RIP. Then,
the maximal-extension entropy of the marginals (pS)S2S is pR, where R is
any perfect DAG whose set of maximal cliques is S.
This result establishes a connection between the IEP and the MaxEnt prob-
lem: the former can be viewed as an algorithm for implementing the latter
whenever S satises RIP. Recall that RIP* holds automatically for m = 2.
Thus, the basic extrapolation method employed in the rst round of the
IEP always implements the maximal-entropy principle. Indeed, I motivated
this method by the idea that the analyst wishes to use all available evidence
without making any active assumption about things for which he has no evi-
dence. This is essentially the maximal-entropy principle; and the proposition
2For a more recent study of information-theoretic methods of extrapolation from limited
data, see Miller and Liu (2002).
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formalizes the connection for m = 2. When m > 2, the unqualied equiv-
alence between the IEP and the maximal-entropy principle breaks down; it
holds only when S satises RIP.
6 Related Literature
This paper draws on two literatures in statistics: graphical models and sta-
tistical inference with missing data. Both links were explained earlier in the
paper. This section focuses on the papers connection to literature within
economics. Recent years have seen intensied interest in equilibrium models
with boundedly rational expectations, in which agentssubjective beliefs
systematically distort the correlation structure of the steady-state distribu-
tion. The distortions take various forms: coarsebeliefs that neglect corre-
lations (Piccione and Rubinstein (2003), Jehiel (2005), Koessler and Jehiel
(2008), Mullainathan et al. (2008), Eyster and Piccione (2013)); failure to
realize how action-consequence correlation would change if o¤-equilibrium
actions were played (Esponda (2008)); belief in spurious correlations due to
naive extrapolation from small samples (Osborne and Rubinstein (1998)); or
attributing uctuations in a certain variable to the wrong cause (Eyster and
Rabin (2005), Ettinger and Jehiel (2010)).
A common justication for models of this kind is that agents receive
partial feedback as they try to learn statistical regularities in their environ-
ment, and therefore their subjective beliefs distort the correlation structure
of the steady-state distribution. In some cases (e.g. Osborne and Rubinstein
(1998), Jehiel (2005)), this idea is formally built into the denition of equi-
librium. In other cases the limited feedback justication is informal and
outside the model. The exercise in this paper can be viewed as a novel for-
malization of this justication and an exploration of its limits. Note that the
maximal-entropy aspect of the IEP is akin to the Occams Razoraspect
of the notion of analogy-based expectations in Jehiel (2005), which assumes
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that the agent imposes an analogy partition on the set of possible contin-
gencies and requires the agents belief to be measurable with respect to that
partition.
The link between partial data and non-rational expectations was studied
from an explicitly dynamic perspective in two recent papers. Esponda and
Pouzo (2016a) propose a general game-theoretic framework, in which each
player has a subjective model, which is a set of stochastic mappings from
his action a to a primitive set of payo¤-relevant consequences y he observes
during his learning process. The feedback is limited because in the true
model, other latentvariables may a¤ect the action-consequence mapping.
Esponda and Pouzo dene an equilibrium concept in which each player best-
replies to a subjective distribution (of y conditional on a) that is closest in his
subjective model to the true equilibrium distribution. Distance is measured
by a weighted version of Kullback-Leibler divergence. Esponda and Pouzo
justify this equilibrium concept as the steady-state of a Bayesian learning
process.
Schwartzstein (2014) studies a dynamic model in which an analyst tries
to predict a variable y as a function of two variables x and z. At every period,
he observes the realizations of y and x. In contrast, he pays attention to the
realization of z only if his belief at the beginning of the period is that z is
su¢ ciently predictive of y. When the analyst chooses not to observe z, he
imputes a constant value. Schwartzstein examines the long-run belief that
emerges from this learning process, and in particular the analysts failure to
perceive correlations among the three variables.
Finally, the broad notion of decision makers as imperfect statisticians
is far from original and has many precedents in the literature - too many
to cite here. What is arguably new about this paper is the emphasis on
the processing of explicitly statistical data, and the distortions that arise
when users of processed data take it at face value and do not internalize the
processing methods.
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7 Conclusion
Economists have two prevailing images of how agents form beliefs. At one
extreme, we have the conventional view of the economic agent as an infallible
(Bayesian) statistician. At the other extreme, we have the image promoted
by behavioral economics, which emphasizes the role of intuition in belief for-
mation. These two pictures have implications for the kind of data that could
be involved in the agents reasoning. By denition, the conventional picture
is compatible with any data - from espresso-machine gossip to large statis-
tical tables. In contrast, intuitive judgments are more naturally associated
with the former kind. It makes sense to think about intuitive probability
judgments in response to a rumor, an anecdote or a terse statement about
probabilities; it makes weaker sense to think in such terms when we describe
reasoning about data that are arrive in the form of large spreadsheets. If we
wish to depart from the view of the economic agent as a supreme statistician,
a di¤erent metaphor is needed for such situations.
In this paper I o¤ered the image of a data monkey, to describe an eco-
nomic agent who faces partial statistical data and subjects it to some method
of extrapolation in order to produce a digestible output. Such an agent may
have an imperfect understanding of his own methods, or he may fail to im-
part such understanding to his audience. This belief-formation error can be
viewed as an organizational, data-saturated analogue to the phenomenon of
base rate neglectthat has been observed in the context of intuitive prob-
ability judgments (Tversky and Kahneman (1974)).3 Of course, the data
monkey image is not restricted to the extrapolation problem; developing
other behaviorally motivatedmodels of how people reason about large sta-
tistical datasets is an exciting direction for future research.
3The idea that agents over-interpret posterior beliefs because they neglect the prior the-
ories that shaped them is related to other psychological phenomena, such as conrmatory
bias (see Rabin and Schrag (1999)).
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Appendix I: Proof of Proposition 2
For convenience, label the variables in C by 1; :::;m. Let us write down the
explicit expression for pR(xC):
pR(xC) =
X
x0m+1;:::;x0n
pR(x1; :::; xm; x
0
m+1; :::; x
0
n) (10)
=
X
x0m+1;:::;x0n
Y
i2C
p(xi j xR(i)\C ; x0R(i) C)
Y
i=2C
p(x0i j xR(i)\C ; x0R(i) C)
(i). Assume C is an ancestral clique in R. Then,
Y
i2C
p(xi j xR(i)\C ; x0R(i) C) = p(x1)
mY
i=2
p(xi j x1; :::; xm 1) = p(xC)
Expression (10) can thus be written as
p(xC)
X
x
0
m+1;:::;x
0
n
 
nY
i=m+1
p(x0i j xR(i)\C ; x0R(i) C)
!
= p(xC)
Therefore, pR0(xC) = p(xC) for every R0 that is equivalent to R.
(ii). Let us distinguish between two cases.
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Case 1 : C is not a clique in R (and therefore also not a clique in any DAG
that is equivalent to R). Then, C contains two variables, labeled w.l.o.g 1
and 2, such that 1 /R2 and 2 /R1. Consider an objective distribution p, for
which every xi, i > 2, is distributed independently, whereas x1 and x2 are
mutually correlated. Then, expression (10) is simplied into
mY
i=1
p(xi)
X
x
0
m+1;:::;x
0
n
nY
i=m+1
p(x0i) =
mY
i=1
p(xi)
whereas the objective distribution can be written as
p(xC) = p(x1)p(x2 j x1)
mY
i=3
p(xi)
The two expressions are di¤erent because x2 and x1 are not independent.
Case 2 : C is a clique which is not ancestral in any DAG in the equivalence
class of R. Suppose that for every node j 2 C, j has no unmarried parents
- i.e., if there exist nodes k; k0 such that kRj and k0Rj, then kRk0 or k0Rk.
In addition, if there is a directed path from some i =2 C to j, then i has no
unmarried parents either. Transform R into another DAG R0 by inverting
every link along every such path. The DAGsR andR0 share the same skeleton
and v-structure. By Proposition 1, they are equivalent. By construction, C
is an ancestral clique in DAG that is equivalent to R, a contradiction.
It follows that R has the following structure. First, there exist three
distinct nodes, denoted w.l.o.g 1; 2; 3, such that 1; 2 =2 C, 1R3, 2R3, 1 /R2 and
2 /R1. Second, there is a directed path from 3 to some node s 2 C, s  3. For
convenience, denote the path by (3; 4; :::; s) - i.e., the immediate predecessor
of any j > 3 along the path is j   1. It is possible that s = 3, in which case
the path is degenerate. W.l.o.g, we can assume that i =2 C for every i 6= s
along this path (otherwise, we can take s to be the lowest-numbered node
that belongs to C along the path).
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Consider any p which is consistent with a DAG R that has the following
structure: rst, 1R2R3 and 1R3; second, for every j 2 f4; :::; sg, R(j) =
fj 1g; and R(j) = ? for every j =2 f2; :::; sg. (Note that the latter property
means that every xj, j =2 f2; :::; sg is independently distributed. Then,
p(x) = pR(x) = p(x1)p(x2 j x1)p(x3 j x1; x2) 
sY
i=4
p(xi j xi 1) 
Y
j>s
p(xj)
In contrast,
pR(x) = p(x1)p(x2)p(x3 j x1; x2) 
sY
i=4
p(xi j xi 1) 
Y
j>s
p(xj)
By denition, every i = 4; :::; s  1 does not belong to C. Denote
q(x0) = p(x01)p(x
0
3 j x01; x02)
 
s 1Y
i=4
p(x0i j x0i 1)
!
p(xs j x0s 1)
Therefore,
p(xC) =
Y
j2C fsg
p(xj)
X
x0
p(x02 j x01)q(x0)
pR(xC) =
Y
j2C fsg
p(xj)
X
x01;:::;x
0
s 1
p(x02)q(x
0)
It is easy to see from these expressions that we can nd a distribution p which
is consistent with R such that pR(xC) 6= p(xC) for some x.
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Appendix II: Selective Datasets
An assumption that runs throughout the paper is that the process that gen-
erates missing data is independent of variables realizations. This is what
enables the analyst to learn the true marginal of p over XS from the dataset
that covers the set of variables S. However, this independence property is
naturally violated in many contexts. For example, data about a politicians
quality is more likely to arrive when he is elected for o¢ ce. Likewise, data
about the value of an investment is more likely to arrive when the investment
is taken. Because the decision to elect a politician or make an investment
is typically based on information that may be correlated with the variable
in question (the politicians quality, the investments value), we cannot as-
sume that the process that generates data is independent of the process that
generates the relevant variablesrealizations.
A number of recent works (e.g., Esponda (2008), Jehiel (2015), Esponda
and Pouzo (2016b)) have analyzed models in which agents naively extrap-
olate their equilibrium beliefs from endogenously selective samples. In this
Appendix, I use a basic version of Jehiels (2015) model to illustrate how
the current formalism can be adapted to the case of selective datasets, thus
providing a new perspective into this interesting class of models.
In Jehiels model, there are three variables: a represents an investors
decision whether to invest in a project;  is the actual value of the project;
and t is the investors private information regarding the projects quality
prior to taking an action. The variable a takes two values, 0 (not investing)
and 1 (investing). The objective distribution p is a long-run joint distribution
over these three variables. A realization of this distribution corresponds to
an episode in which an individual investor faced an investment opportunity
and had some private information regarding its value. Given the variables
interpretation, it is natural to assume that every distribution in the relevant
domain satises the conditional independence property a ?  j t.
An analyst wishes to understand empirical regularities in this environ-
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ment. His database consists of two datasets. The rst dataset is an innitely
large collection of independent joint observations of  and t. This enables him
to learn p(; t). The second dataset consists of innitely many joint observa-
tions of  and a. However, each of these observations satises a = 1 - that is,
the dataset only records the value of an investment when it is taken; there
are no observations of an investments counterfactual value when it is not
taken. The interpretation is that each observation in this dataset describes
the outcome of a particular investment decision, without recording the pri-
vate information that lay behind it. This dataset is clearly selective; and
it can be described by a distribution p^ over (a; ) that is dened as follows:
p^(a = 1) = 1, and p^( j a = 1) = p( j a = 1).
Suppose that the analyst applies the IEP to this database. Because m =
2, any ordering of the database is maximally overlapping. The procedures
nal output is
q2(a; ; t) = 2  p(; t)p^(a j ) + (1  2)  p^(a; )p(t j )
Because there are no observations of a = 0, q2(a = 0; ; t) = 0 for every ; t.
For a = 1, the expression for q2 simplies into
q2(a = 1; ; t) = 2  p(; t) + (1  2)  p( j a = 1)p(t j )
= p(t j ) 2  p() + (1  2)  p( j a = 1)
Suppose that the analyst now makes the output of his research available
to a potential new investor who receives a particular private signal t. The
investor knows that not investing leads to a sure payo¤ of 0, independently
of  or t. He relies on q2 for estimating the expected payo¤ from investing
conditional on his signal. In other words, he will invest if and only ifX

q2( j a = 1; t) > 0
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In the 2 ! 1 limit, the conditional distribution q2( j a = 1; t) converges
to p( j t). This is the quantity a rational investor should calculate, because
p satises  ? a j t. In this case, the new investor will choose to invest if and
only if it is rational to do so.
In contrast, in the 2 ! 0 limit, q2( j a = 1; t) converges to
p( j a = 1)p(t j )P
0 p(
0 j a = 1)p(t j 0)
Given our assumptions on p, the term p( j a = 1)p(t j ) can be rewritten
as
p(t)p( j t)
X
t0
p(t0 j )p(a = 1 j t0)
Therefore, the new investor will choose to invest if and only ifP
 p(t)p( j t) (
P
t0 p(t
0 j )p(a = 1 j t0)) P
 p(t)p( j t) (
P
t0 p(t
0 j )p(a = 1 j t0)) > 0 (11)
In Jehiel (2015), this inequality is precisely the criterion that denes in-
vestorssubjectively optimal behavior. The distribution p is in equilibrium
when an investor whose private signal is t chooses a = 1 if and only if the
inequality holds. This notion of equilibrium is meant to capture the idea that
when investors try to evaluate the consequences of an investment decision,
they naively extrapolate from a large sample of prior investments, without
taking into account that such a sample exhibits positive selection. The same
criterion emerges from our procedure of extrapolating from partial statistics,
when the dataset that records joint observations of a and  gets arbitrarily
large weight.
Surprisingly, the investment criterion given by (11) would also emerge
if we assumed that the objective distribution is induced by a population of
investors whose subjective belief over (; t; a) is given by a perfect-DAG rep-
resentation, where the DAG is R : t  ! a. Corollary 1 thus implies that
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a database that consists of non-selective datasets covering (; t) and (; a)
would have led to the same prediction. That is, the selectiveness assumption
is inessential for the models prediction in the 2 ! 0 limit.
To derive this result, note that if p(a j t) > 0, then the investor should
nd a to be subjectively optimal given t - i.e., a maximizesX

pR( j t; a)  a
where a is the investors payo¤ from his decision. Note that
pR(t; a) =
X

p()p(t j )p(a j )
=
X

p()p(t j )
X
t0
p(t0 j )p(a j t0)
Therefore, if p(a j t) > 0, then a maximizesP
 p()p(t j ) (
P
t0 p(t
0 j )p(a j t0)) aP
 p()p(t j ) (
P
t0 p(t
0 j )p(a j t0))
It follows that the DMs subjective evaluation of a = 0 is zero, and his
evaluation of a = 1 coincides with the L.H.S of (11).
This coincidence is due to the strong structure of the selective dataset. In
Jehiels investment problem (as in Espondas (2008) leading bilateral trade
example), there are two actions: one action generates a xed payo¤ and no
observations, whereas another action generates observations and uncertain
payo¤s. As a result, although the IEPs output q2 does not take the form of
a DAG representation, the behavior it induces in the 2 ! 0 limit is as if
the investors subjective belief had a perfect-DAG representation.
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